Issue 011/2005


This time, the United States is counting on (rather than simply desiring) Canadian co-operation to assure maritime security. Because of North America's relative invulnerability to conventional military attack, physical protection of the continental coasts has not been in the policy mindset since at least the end of the Second World War. New realities now demand it: The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that a new enemy can strike on North American soil, exploiting weaknesses in security rather than advanced military technological prowess. As a result, aviation security has been tightened -- but gaping holes remain in ocean approaches and ports. This weakness (the "soft underbelly of globalization") leaves open the possibility that merchant ships, and the containers they unload at North American ports (including those on the Great Lakes), could be used to introduce the tools of terrorism.

As part of a "layered" maritime defence of the American homeland, Washington wants to enhance "maritime domain awareness" in its ocean approaches and coastal waters. It is also interested in increasing NORAD's maritime dimension, and a Canada-U.S. binational planning group at NORAD has been looking into ways to strengthen bilateral maritime co-operation. The U.S. Navy's traditional focus on defence through the projection of sea power abroad remains largely intact -- but there's also the U.S. Coast Guard, the lead agency in maritime homeland security. It's an armed service (unlike the Canadian Coast Guard) and serves as a second navy.

Canadians should view this new U.S. emphasis on maritime homeland security and defence as an opportunity to help shape an increasingly important dimension of bilateral defence co-operation. Ottawa has already moved in several areas such as port security. To make our marine transportation system more secure, the recent federal budget called for new mid-shore patrol

vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard for use in the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway.

But Canada's navy must play a larger role in maritime homeland security than its U.S. counterpart, and to do so will require sufficient and suitable capabilities. While long used for domestic roles such as fisheries protection and search and rescue, our navy (like the U.S. Navy) is mainly postured for high-seas operations and overseas power projection. The projection of force abroad is essential for Canada's broader foreign policy objectives; a greater emphasis on continental maritime homeland security is no excuse to abandon overseas capabilities and operations. But unlike the U.S., Canada can't afford two navies, one to project power overseas power and another to support homeland security.

With the Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, its frigates and destroyers (and even its submarines), along with its surveillance capabilities, the Canadian navy is already well positioned to contribute to continental maritime security. These forces can work with other government departments, such as the Canadian Coast Guard and the RCMP. But the navy will need additional capabilities, and it has been investigating options for acquiring new, more sophisticated, long-range coastal defence vessels to fill gaps in its fleet.

In fact, we need a navy for all seas. A Canadian navy that plays an enhanced role in the maritime security of North America will pay substantial dividends with regard to both national security and sovereignty and Canada-U.S. defence relations.

Joel J. Sokolsky is dean of arts at the Royal Military College. His study, Guarding the Continental Coasts: United States Maritime Homeland Security and Canada, was just published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

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